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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the relationship between divided government and real per capita
gross state product in U.S. states using a panel study of data from all of the contiguous U.S.
states, except Nebraska, for the period of 1990 to 2008. Some literature can be found on the
relationship between divided government and economic growth at the national level. There is a
lack of study of this relationship at the state level. Real per capita gross state product is the
dependent variable in this study. Divided government, partisan control of the governor’s office,
partisan control of the state legislature, combined federal and state government expenditures as a
percentage of gross state product, educational attainment levels, and population density are the
independent variables. Average yearly temperature and the number of years that members of the
highest court were allowed to hold their office were also included as variables in my original
model. These variables were dropped when it became apparent that a fixed effects model was
necessary for this study. The effect of average yearly temperatures became insignificant once
dummies for years and states were introduced in the fixed effects model.
The results of this study indicate that there is no relationship between divided government
and real per capita GDP. On the other hand the results do indicate that increases in government
spending, as a percentage of GDP, will have an adverse effect on real per capita GDP. These
results are tentative since it is possible that my model was incorrectly specified due to my
inability to obtain a variable that would measure changes in capital infrastructure over time.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
When researching articles that examine the factors that affect economic growth, one can
easily find literature on the relationship between economic growth and variables such as human
capital, government spending, taxation, and investment. However, literature on the relationship
between economic growth and state partisan politics is scarce. In spite of this scarcity, there is
much political debate concerning the effects of partisan politics on the U.S. economy. Democrats
and Republicans both claim that their respective policies are best for the economy. The purpose
of this paper is to examine the relationship between divided government and real per capita gross
state product in the contiguous states of the United States. Gross state product and per capita
gross state product will hereafter be respectively referred to as gross domestic product and per
capita GDP.
When a party holds control of both the governorship and the legislature it is referred to as
unified government. Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) define divided government as “where one
party holds the presidency and the other has a majority in Congress” (p.2). I adapt this definition
of divided government to the state level by replacing the word presidency with governor’s office
and the word Congress with the state legislature. Divided government is defined in this
document as when one party holds the governor’s office and the other has a majority in the state
legislature. I use Calcagno and Lopez’ (2010) method of measuring divided government and
apply it to government at the state level. This method is described in Chapter 3 of my thesis.
Rogers (2005) refines the definition of divided government into divided branch government
and divided legislative government. According to Rogers, “Divided branch government exists
when an executive of one party faces a unified legislature of the opposite party. Divided
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legislative government exists when each bicameral chamber is controlled by a different party”
(p.217). Studies of partisan politics in the U.S. often focus on how unified Democrat
government, unified Republican government, and divided government affect government
spending, taxation, and government’s ability to pass important legislation and make difficult
decisions.
Among the studies that examine the relationship between partisan government and
economic growth, the Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) study is frequently cited. The authors
examined the relationship between partisan politics and economic growth at the federal level and
found that the economy decelerates during the first two years of Republican administrations and
accelerates during this same time period for Democrat administrations. One cannot draw any
decisive conclusion from the study regarding the long-term economic effects of partisan
government. I believe that an examination of partisan politics at the state level may shed some
light on the relationship between partisan politics and per capita GDP.
The U.S. economy does not operate in isolation from the rest of the world. Considering that
the effects of foreign events are difficult to isolate from those of federal legislation, an
examination of how partisan politics affects the economy at the state level is likely to render a
better understanding of the relationship between economic growth and the three governing
configurations of: unified Democrat government, unified Republican government, and divided
government. Economic growth obviously leads to job creation and a higher standard of living in
U.S. states. Given the lack of studies on the relationship between divided government and per
capita GDP at the state level, my literature review focuses on how divided government is related
to variables that affect economic growth.
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I postulate that divided government may improve per capita GDP. My premise is that
divided government will reduce the scope of government. I additionally postulate that divided
government may provide better checks and balances than unified government.
Reductions in the growth of the scope of government may be related to decreases in
legislative output that seem to be associated with divided government. Given the relatively high
levels of the scope of combined federal, state, and local government during the last few decades,
I conjecture that a deceleration in the growth of the scope of government will have a salutary
effect on real per capita GDP. Conversely, any acceleration in growth of the scope of
government will have a detrimental effect on real per capita GDP. Divided government should
enhance checks and balances that reduce corruption. Reductions in corruption will have a
positive effect on real per capita GDP.

1.1a Literature related to my First HypothesisDivided government reduces the scope of government.
My first hypothesis, divided government is likely to reduce the scope of government, is
plausible given the outcome of studies done by Crain and Muris (1995) and Rogers (2005). Crain
and Muris (1995) found that states in the U.S. with unified governments had higher expenditures
and higher revenues than divided governments.
Rogers (2005) found that divided legislatures decrease legislative production by almost
30%. I hypothesize that reductions in legislative output will be associated with reductions in
growth of the scope of government. I do not attempt to prove that a reduction in legislative
output leads to less growth of government. This is an association that merits a study of its own.
Reed (2006) showed that Democrat control of the state legislature led to an increased tax
burden (ratio of total state and local tax revenues to state Personal Income) and that the party of
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the governor was of little consequence. If my second hypothesis that less government is better
for economic growth holds true, the results of Reed’s study would suggest that a divided
government with a Democrat legislature would have lower growth than a divided government
with a Republican legislature.

1.1b Literature related to my Second HypothesisEconomic growth is impaired by the growth of government.
My second hypothesis, decreases in the rate of growth of the scope of government will
have a salutary effect on economic growth, is based on the conjecture that governmental
expenditures in the U.S. as a percentage of GDP have reached such high proportions that their
marginal benefits of spending are outweighed by their marginal costs. I will present various
studies that support my conjecture that increases in the size of government reduce economic
growth as government spending reaches excessively high proportions of GDP.
Barro and Jong-Wha Lee (1994) observed that high ratios of government consumption
(measured net of spending on defense and education) to GDP had a negative effect on economic
growth. Mofidi and Stone (1990) found that a rise in transfer payments as a proportion of state
and local expenditures had a negative effect on both net investment and employment in
manufacturing.
Although the relationship between the development of human capital and economic growth
through education and health care is evident, government’s immoderate growth in the U.S. seems
to have rendered true assertions by Mitchell (2005) that the federal government’s role in these
fields has led to great market distortions and a misallocation of resources that result from the
“third-party payer” problem and bureaucracies that restrain innovation. Government spending in
the U.S. requires taxes that discourage productive behavior, government programs such as
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welfare and unemployment programs lead to an inefficient use of resources since they promote
counterproductive behavior of choosing idleness over industry, and programs such as Medicaid
lead to a misallocation of resources since they encourage people to reduce their reported incomes
either by real means or by deception. Mitchell illustrates the concept that initially the benefits of
government spending outweigh their associated costs but that increases in government spending
beyond some point become counterproductive in terms of economic growth through the use of a
Rahn Curve. The Rahn Curve, named after economist Richard Rahn, shows an inverted
parabolic-like relationship between the growth rate and government spending as a percentage of
GDP.

Figure 1.1
Numerous studies support my conjecture that the scope of government in the U.S. has
reached such proportions that most increases in government spending generally have greater
economic costs than benefits. These studies indicate that reductions in government spending
would probably improve our economy. Peden (1991) found that productivity was maximized
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when government expenditures accounted for about 17% of U.S. GDP. He maintained that
maximum productivity would be attained at about half the level of total government spending for
1986. Abrams (1999) provided evidence that reducing the share of U.S. government from 36.7%
of GDP to 23% might reduce unemployment by 2.9%. Vedder and Gallaway (1998) indicated
that the optimal size of the federal government is about 17.45% of GDP and that when
government exceeds this size that the costs outweigh the benefits of governmental growth.
Federal outlays have exceeded 20% of GDP since 1995. Scully (2000) found that total
government taxation beyond 21% in the U.S. reduces economic growth.
Helms (1985) used data from 48 contiguous states in a time series-cross section approach
to show that states using relatively higher amounts of taxes to fund transfer payment programs
suffered a reduction in potential economic growth. Although Helms also did find that taxes used
to finance public services might have benefits that outweigh their costs, there is the possibility
that this relationship no longer holds given the relatively large increases in the size of
government since the period studied by Helms. I conjecture that increases in the size of
government are such that increases in the proportion dedicated towards transfer payments
combined with a decrease in the marginal benefits of other governmental spending has led to a
general condition where increases in the scope of government have had a detrimental effect on
economic growth. State and local government expenditures have increased significantly since the
period studied by Helms. Between 1965 and 1979, the period observed in Helm’s study, state
and local revenues as a percentage of U.S. GDP averaged 11.61%. From 1990 to 2009 the
average was 13.40% with no year below 12.72%. Table 1.1 provides figures on the growth of
local and state government as a percentage of GDP.
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Table 1.1 The Growth of Local and State Government 1965-2009
Current tax receipts and GDP data were obtained from www.bea.gov. Last column calculated by the author.
Year
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Current Tax
Receipts
66,532
74,934
82,520
93,517
105,454
120,081
134,927
158,434
174,342
188,080
209,588
233,673
259,938
287,575
308,356
338,169
370,234
391,434
428,609
480,153
521,069
561,635
590,576
635,533
687,489
737,958
789,397
846,235
888,153
944,835
991,885
1,045,084
1,099,472
1,164,502
1,240,416
1,322,602
1,374,005
1,412,699
1,496,313
1,600,964
1,730,421
1,829,663
1,923,056
1,967,162
2,005,756

GDP
719,115
787,692
832,445
909,843
984,431
1,038,326
1,126,817
1,237,885
1,382,269
1,499,452
1,637,700
1,824,583
2,030,130
2,293,762
2,562,228
2,788,143
3,126,837
3,253,194
3,534,606
3,930,895
4,217,470
4,460,067
4,736,354
5,100,422
5,482,146
5,800,527
5,992,094
6,342,306
6,667,350
7,085,160
7,414,655
7,838,456
8,332,362
8,793,495
9,353,484
9,951,482
10,286,167
10,642,316
11,142,143
11,867,753
12,638,381
13,398,917
14,061,799
14,369,059
14,119,040
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Current Tax Receipts as
Percentage of GDP
9.25%
9.51%
9.91%
10.28%
10.71%
11.56%
11.97%
12.80%
12.61%
12.54%
12.80%
12.81%
12.80%
12.54%
12.03%
12.13%
11.84%
12.03%
12.13%
12.21%
12.36%
12.59%
12.47%
12.46%
12.54%
12.72%
13.17%
13.34%
13.32%
13.34%
13.38%
13.33%
13.20%
13.24%
13.26%
13.29%
13.36%
13.27%
13.43%
13.49%
13.69%
13.66%
13.68%
13.69%
14.21%

As can be seen total government revenues as a percentage of GDP has grown considerably
between the two periods of 1965-1980 and 1990-2007.
States have also increased their public welfare payments as a percentage of total general
expenditures. This percentage was 11.7% during the period examined by Helms and increased to
13.0% for 1980-1990, and 16.6% for 1990-2007. See the Appendix for the Table of State and
Local General Expenditures for the U.S. by Function, 1965-2007. Data from the Vedder and
Gallaway (1998) study also provides evidence that both transfer payments and interest as a
percentage of total federal spending increased considerably between 1947 and 1996. See Vedder
and Gallaway’s Table 3 in the Appendix.
The key to determining how unified Democrat government, unified Republican
government, and divided government affect per capita GDP is tied to the effect that each one of
these types of government configurations will have on spending. I do not attempt to show their
effect in this study but do recommend that it be done as a future study. Other than the Crain and
Muris (1995) and Alt and Lowry (1994) studies, which examined data from before the 1990s, I
am unaware of the existence of more recent studies regarding the relationship between divided
government at the state level and its effect on government spending.
1.1c Literature related to my Third HypothesisDivided government reduces corruption and thus improves economic growth.
Divided governments may improve the performance of the checks and balances that are
designed to moderate legislation and prevent the abuse of power. Divided government may thus
foster an environment with less corruption. Less corruption is associated with lower transaction
costs. Alt and Lassen (2007) demonstrated that divided state government was associated with a
reduction in corruption. It is self evident that corruption and trust are inversely related. Dincer
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and Uslaner (2010) demonstrated that in the U.S. trust had a positive effect on economic growth.
Divided government will foster a political environment that enhances economic growth.
My hypotheses may be rendered false if the following hold true:
1. Divided government does not reduce the scope of government. This relationship is
unknown.
2. Reductions in the rate of growth of the scope of government are not associated with
improvements in economic growth. I am confident that this is not the case based on
studies reviewed in this paper.
3. Divided government does not improve the functioning of checks and balances that reduce
corruption. This relationship is unknown.
4. Corruption is not a significant problem in the U.S.
1.2 Regarding the Variables of Partisan Affiliation of Governor, Educational Attainment
and Population Density
Partisan Affiliation of Governor
Over 80% of state governors have line-item vetoes. U.S. Senate Report 104-009 of the
104th Congress (1995) includes a table of data that shows 42 states gave governors line-item
vetoes (the exceptions were Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Nevada, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, and Vermont). Governors thus have much more power over budgets than
presidents who do not have line-item veto power. I have made no conjecture as to the magnitude
or sign of the coefficient for the variable of the partisan affiliation of the governor. Since divided
government is a function of the partisan affiliation of a governor, the partisan affiliation of a
governor must be included as a variable in this study.

9

Educational Attainment
I expected educational attainment levels to be directly related to real per capita GDP.
Endogeneity is likely in this relationship. As a state’s economy improves it will invest more in
the education of its population, and as the population becomes more educated, the state will
become more economically productive. In an international study, Barro (2001) found that both
the quantity and quality of education were related to subsequent growth. Since this relationship is
not the focus of my study, I will not delve into this relationship in my literature review. It is
widely acknowledged that the quality of human capital is a key determinant of economic output.
It is also well documented that educational attainment levels are directly related to income levels
in the U.S. It is therefore logical that educational attainment levels are directly related to the
quality of human capital. Firms pay higher wages to obtain the labor of more educated workers
because they are more productive. A quick review of contemporary scholarly articles that
examine the relationship between educational attainment and real per capita GDP reveals that
researchers find either a positive or an insignificant relationship between educational attainment
levels and economic growth.
Population Density
I expected population density to be positively related to real per capita GDP. More
developed countries tend to have more urban populations and greater capital infrastructure. If
U.S. states mirror nations in the relationship between urbanization and capital development, one
would expect states with more urban populations to have a higher capital/labor ratio. I hoped that
changes in population density in the U.S. during the 18 years observed would serve to some
extent as a proxy for changes in capital infrastructure since I was unable to obtain data on the
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capital infrastructure of U.S. states. I do not believe that the changes in population density served
as a proxy for capital as you will see in my empirical results and conclusions.
The next section is a literature review. Following the literature review is a section
describing the methodology used by this study. After the description of the methodology and
data used in this study you will find the empirical results of the study, and finally a section on the
conclusions of this study and suggestions for further examination.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Due to the lack of literature available on the topic of how divided government is related to
economic growth, I will also review literature that examines: divided government and the scope
of government, various determinants of economic growth including the relationship between the
scope of government and economic growth, divided government and corruption, and trust and
economic growth. The literature reviewed for this paper is divided into three categories: State
Level Studies, Federal Level Studies, and International Level Studies.
2.1 State Level Studies
Impact on Legislative Output
Bowling and Ferguson (2001) draw from data on all bills considered in each of the fifty
states of the U.S. during the 1994 legislative session to examine among other things the effect of
divided government on the passage of law in high conflict areas. They find that divided
government reduces the chance of a bill passing in high conflict areas. They also identify
redistributive legislation and regulatory legislation as being areas of high conflict that will suffer
a larger negative impact in the legislative process due to partisan and ideological differences that
intensify the conflict surrounding the passage of such a bill.
Rogers (2005) examined the legislative production of 141 bicameral legislative sessions of
23 states from 1981 through 1993 with a focus on the difference in effects between divided
branch government and divided legislature government. He found no effect for divided branch
government but did find that divided legislatures decrease legislative production by almost 30%.
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Impact of Divided Government on Government Spending and Growth
Using a sample consisting of state fiscal data from 1982 through 1988, Crain and Muris
(1995) found that states with unified governments had higher expenditures and higher revenues
than divided governments.
Continuous one-party dominance of the executive and the legislative branches gives a 6
percent push to per capita expenditures ($89) and a 17 percent push to revenues
($324)...Democrat-dominated legislatures add 8 percent to revenues ($146 per capita)
compared to Republican-dominated legislatures. The majority party variable is not
significant in the expenditure equation. (p. 329)
Alt and Lowry (1994) analyzed the effect of partisan control on state government spending,
taxes, and the ability to make hard decisions. They drew their data from the 48 continental states
for the period of 1968 through 1987. The authors found that Democrat governments targeted
spending and taxes to higher shares of state personal income, while divided governments,
especially in the case where different parties controlled each house of the legislature (splitlegislatures), were less able to adjust to the revenue shocks that led to budget deficits.
The Composition of State Expenditures and Growth
Helms (1985) used annual data from the period of 1965 through 1979 for 48 states to
demonstrate that, “A state's ability to attract, retain, and encourage business activity is
significantly affected by its pattern of taxation” (p. 581). However, Helms cautioned that taxes
could not be viewed in isolation from the public services that were funded by taxes and their
value to businesses and citizens. He concluded that states that use a substantial amount of their
taxes to fund transfer payments will suffer significantly in terms of economic growth. On the
other hand, Helms also contended that certain public services have benefits that may outweigh
their costs.
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Mofidi and Stone (1990), through an analysis of data for all fifty states from 1962 to 1982,
observe that both private investment and employment in manufacturing decline as a result of
increases in transfer payments and increase with expenditures on education, health, and
highways.
Impact of Divided Government on Corruption and Economic Growth
Alt and Lassen (2007) show that divided state government and elected rather than
appointed state judges are associated with a reduction in corruption. Using data from U.S. states
for the periods 1990–1994 and 1995–1999, Dincer and Uslaner (2010) demonstrate that trust and
economic growth have a direct relationship. Their results show a ten-percentage point increase in
trust increases the growth rate of GDP by 0.5 percentage points.
2.2 Federal Level Studies
It is worth examining the studies at the federal level with the understanding that the effects
of divided government at the state level may differ from those at the federal level. Much of the
research regarding divided government focuses on the ability (or lack thereof) of divided
governments to pass significant legislation and the effect of divided government on spending.
Since spending has increased at a faster rate than the growth of GDP, I believe it is not a far leap
to conclude that “important” legislation will likely include provisions that increase the scope of
government.
The Impact of Divided Government on Legislative Output
The conventional wisdom is that divided government inhibits the passage of important
legislation, although there are authors such as Mayhew (1991) who maintain that divided
government does not have an effect on the passage of important legislation. In the Mayhew
study, to qualify as innovative policies the policies had to be (1) considered particularly
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promising by contemporary experts, or (2) be considered to retrospectively count most in their
areas by experts. Kelly (1993) examined the study done by Mayhew and refined the definition of
innovative policy by requiring that the policies fulfill not one but both of the prior mentioned
conditions. The more stringent rule set by Kelly led to different results. After making this
refinement to the condition for being innovative, unlike Mayhew, Kelly demonstrated that
“divided government does have a significant negative impact on the emergence of innovative
policy” (p. 477).
Using a different statistical model, Howell et al. (2000) extended the analysis of Mayhew
for laws enacted from 1945-1994. Howell et al. concluded that divided government reduced the
“production of landmark legislation by about 30%, at least when productivity is measured on the
basis of contemporaneous perceptions of legislative significance” (p.302).
Edwards et al. (1997) showed that divided government constrained the passage of
important legislation that faces opposition by the executive branch. Edwards et al. analyzed data
gathered from the Congressional Quarterly’s yearly Almanac on the legislative production of
Congress for the years 1947 to 1992 and concluded that, “divided government inhibits the
passage of important legislation” (p. 562).
Binder (1999) studied the ability of our federal political system to treat public problems.
Using unsigned editorials from the New York Times between 1947 and 1996 as a means of
quantifying the “systemic agenda”, she examined the link between intra-branch conflict and
legislative output in proportion to the policy agenda of Congress. Binder concluded that it seems
that intra-branch politics may be as important to explaining policy deadlock as inter-branch
conflict.
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John J. Coleman (1999) contends that the statistical evidence supports the notion that
unified government is “more responsive to the public mood” and that parties “generate
incentives to cooperation that help transcend some of the policymaking gaps created by the
Constitution”; he concludes that unified government “is more likely to pass significant public
policy” (p.821).
The Impact of Divided Government on Spending
Niskanen (2003) showed that for the forty years of federal government since the beginning
of the Eisenhower administration through the Clinton administration, unified government was
associated with greater government spending. He argues that there is a greater probability that
major reforms passed by divided governments will be longer lasting since they require bipartisan
support and unified governments are more likely to lead us into a major war.
Sundquist (1988) believes that the president and Congress must act in unison for
government to function properly and he describes divided government as “characterized by
conflict, delay, and indecision, and leading frequently to deadlock, inadequate and ineffective
policies, or no policies at all” (p.629). Sundquist believes that healthy government is
characterized by competition between the parties but that this competition best serves the country
when it results in a unified government rather than a divided government that will be
characterized by “unhealthy, debilitating conflict between the institutions of government
themselves” (p.629). Sundquist contends that in turn, this debilitating conflict that results from
the philosophical differences between the parties will result in deadlock that will only be broken
when a problem confronting government has “deteriorated into a crisis” (p.629). Sundquist uses
the difficulty of passing budgets during the Reagan presidency as an example of the failure of
divided government since neither the Democrats nor Republicans took ownership for the budget
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deficits; both parties pointed the finger of blame at each other for the failure to balance the
budget.
The Impact of Partisan Politics on the Economy
At the national level, Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) analyzed the effect of partisan
government on economic growth through an examination of U.S. economic growth from 1915
through 1988. They found that Republican administrations tend to have a decelerating effect on
economic growth during the first two years of each term, whereas Democrat administrations
have the opposite effect (an accelerating effect on economic growth) during the first two years of
each term. Their study revealed that the particular party in control of the presidency has no
significant effect on growth rates during the last two years of a presidential term. Alesina and
Rosenthal (1995) found that differences in growth rates during the first two years is a result of
uncertainty generated by competitive partisan politics in which Republicans target relatively
lower inflation rates and Democrats target relatively lower unemployment rates. The respective
targets of each party result in Republicans (Democrats) implementing economic policies that
constrict (stimulate) aggregate demand. These policies have their effects during the first two
years of a presidential term due to wage rigidity, but growth returns to its natural rate as wages
adjust in the long term, years three and four of a presidential term.
Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) did not make studying the effects of divided government a
central aspect of their study. They concluded that they did not believe that divided government at
the federal level has the effects of gridlock on fiscal policy found by Alt and Lowry (1994) at the
state level. Based on the findings of Fiorina (1992) and Mayhew (1991), Alesina and Rosenthal
(1995) concluded that the effects of divided government in terms of government inaction would
not be large.
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Evidence from Hibbs (1977), a time-series analysis of quarterly postwar national
unemployment data for the United States from 1948 to 1972, suggests that Democrat
governments drive unemployment rates downward while Republican governments drive
unemployment rates upward. These results are similar to those of Alesina and Rosenthal (1995).
The Size of Government and Economic Growth
Peden (1991) analyzed data from the U.S. economy from 1929-1986. Peden found that
increases in productivity increase with government size up to approximately 17% of GDP, and
beyond this optimal level of government size of approximately 17%, increases in the size of
government reduce the growth of productivity. He concluded that the reduction in growth of
productivity for the 1970s and 1980s “is the result of dramatic growth in government” (p.169).
As can be seen from the data in Table 2.1, the size of government as a percentage of GDP has
been quite large in recent years.

Figure 2.1
The Vedder and Gallaway (1998) study of variations of real gross domestic product in the
U.S. from 1947-1987 produced data that suggests that reducing the growth of the scope of

18

federal government, especially in the area of transfer payments, would improve economic
growth. Vedder and Gallaway use an Armey Curve, named after Richard Keith “Dick” Armey
former U.S. House Majority Leader, to illustrate that real GDP is maximized at lower rates of
federal government spending than the current levels. An Armey Curve shows the relationship
between federal government spending and real gross domestic product by plotting real GDP on
the vertical axis and federal spending as a percentage of GDP on the horizontal axis. The
difference between an Armey Curve and a Rahn Curve is that a Rahn Curve plots the rate of
growth for real GDP on the vertical axis while the Armey Curve simply plots real GDP on the
vertical axis. The results of Vedder and Gallaway showed that the real GDP would peak when
government spending was 17.45% of GDP, which was below actual federal government
spending of 20 to 22 % that had occurred in recent years. Vedder and Gallaway point out that the
last time federal government spending was less than 17.5% was 1965. The authors also
emphasized that their Armey Curve analysis indicated that transfer payments reached their
optimal size for output maximization at about 7.33 percent of GDP and that transfer payments of
11.5% at the time of their study accounted for a 4.2 percent gap from the optimal point.
2.3 International Level Studies
Education, Government Consumption, Gross Investment, and Growth
Barro (2001) conducted a panel study of 100 countries from 1965 to 1995 and found that
both the quantity and quality of education were related to subsequent growth. Barro and JongWha Lee (1994) examined data from 1965 to 1985 for 116 countries. They observed that both
political instability and an overly high ratio of government consumption (measured net of
spending on defense and education) to GDP had a negative effect whereas the ratio of gross
domestic investment to GDP had a positive effect on the growth of per capita GDP.
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The Size of Government and Economic Growth
When reading the following studies, bear in mind that actual measurements of total
(federal, state, and local) government spending in the U.S. have exceeded 32% of GDP for every
year from 1992 to 2008.

Table 2.1: Total Government Spending in the U.S.
U.S. GDP $ Total Government Spending
Year
billions
as a percentage of GDP
1992
6342.3
37.04
1993
6667.4
36.31
1994
7085.2
35.38
1995
7414.7
35.54
1996
7838.5
34.69
1997
8332.4
33.77
1998
8793.5
33.24
1999
9353.5
32.65
2000
9951.5
32.56
2001
10286.2
33.38
2002
10642.3
34.75
2003
11142.1
35.28
2004
11867.8
34.78
2005
12638.4
34.79
2006
13398.9
35.06
2007
14077.6
34.98
2008
14441.4
36.94
Source:
http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/us_20th_cent
ury_chart.html#usgs101

Landau (1983) examined the relationship between government consumption expenditures
and per capita economic growth for 96 countries for various time periods ranging from the 1960s
into the 1970s. He found a negative relationship between government consumption expenditures
and the rate of growth of per capita GDP, but he did make the point that his conclusions were
tentative due to the limitations of both his theory and the available data.
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Abrams (1999) uses data from 1984-1993 for three groups of countries, (1) the G-7, (2)
fifteen countries with populations over five million and per capita GDP in excess of $15,000, and
(3) the OECD countries to examine the relationship between unemployment rates and the size of
government (the G-U curve). He concludes that as government outlays grow as a percentage of
GDP, unemployment will rise with an accompanied loss of output. He estimates that a reduction
of the U.S. government's average share of GDP from 36.7 to 23% would reduce the
unemployment rate by approximately 2.9%. He uses Okun’s law to claim that this 2.9%
reduction in the unemployment rate corresponds to a potential 5.8% increase in real output.
Scully (2000) examined the relationship between Social Progress and Public Spending
shares by examining data from 112 countries for the year of 1995. He constructed a relationship
between government spending and a multidimensional quality of life index. Total U.S.
government expenditure at the time according to Scully was actually 36.7% of GDP. This 36.7%
level is way beyond the level of 21% that according to Scully is the limit at which the tax burden
necessary to finance spending slows economic growth in the U.S. This 21% limit is below all the
corresponding figures for years 1992-2008 in Table 2.1.
The study done by Gwartney et al. (1998) was done both at the national level and the
international level. The authors’ main contention was that excessively large government has
reduced economic growth. The authors used two data sets. The first set of data included
measures from 23 OECD countries for the period of 1960-1996. The second set of data included
measures from 60 countries for the period of 1980-1995. The authors concluded,
There is overwhelming evidence that both the size of government and its expansion have
exerted a negative impact on economic growth during the last several decades...All of the
evidence suggests that the level of government that maximizes the performance of the
economy would place government expenditures at 15 percent or less of GDP. (p.27)

21

Gwartney et al. point to the inverse relationship between increases in government outlays
as a percentage of GDP and the growth rate of real GDP for the United Kingdom, Ireland, and
New Zealand to support their contention that increases in the size of government in more
developed countries crowds out investment, which in turn reduces productivity and the growth of
real GDP. I have included reproductions of exhibits 9, 3A, 3B, 3C, and 3D from Gwartney et al.
in the Appendix.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Statistical analysis will be used to analyze the relationship between divided government
and real per capita GDP. A model that analyzes the relationship between divided government
and real per capita GDP is developed using the variables listed in Table 3.1. A table of
descriptions of the unit measurement of variables can be found in the appendix.
Table 3.1: Variables, Mnemonics, Descriptions, and Sources of Data
Variable
Mnemonic
Y
DivG

RPC

RPM

Variable Description
Real per Capita Gross
Domestic Product
Divided Government

Dummies for Republican and
Independent Governors

GC

General Consumption
Expenditures by Federal and
State Government as a
Percentage of GDP
Educational Attainment
Population Density

SPLEG

Website of the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (2010)
Derived from data obtained from the
National Conference of State
Legislatures in conjunction with data
from the website of the National
Governors Association (2010)
Derived from data obtained from the
National Conference of State
Legislatures (2010)
Derived from data obtained from the
National Conference of State
Legislatures (2010)
Derived from data obtained from the
National Governors Association (2010)
website (http://www.nga.org)
Fraser Institute’s Publication of Free the
World.com. (2010)

Republican Party Control of
the State Legislature as a
Percentage
Dummy for Republican
Majority (RPC>50)

RG, IG

EDUC
PDEN

Source of Data

Divided Legislature DummyA distinct party controls each
house of the legislature.
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U.S. Census Bureau (2010)
Derived from data obtained from the
U.S. Census Bureau (2010)
Derived from data obtained from the
National Conference of State
Legislatures in conjunction with data
from the National Governors
Association (2010) website

The data used in this model was obtained from a variety of sources. Real per capita GDP is
in chained 2000 dollars and was obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2010).
Mr. Tim Storey of the National Conference of State Legislatures (2010) provided data on
the partisan control of state legislatures. A measure of divided government was derived from this
data using the Calcagno and Lopez (2010) method where nst is defined as the total combined
number of seats in the upper and lower legislative houses (indexed by state s and year t) and gst is
defined as the number of legislative seats possessed by the party of the governor. The variable of
divided government is then defined as DGst = − log [(gst + 0.5) / (nst – gst + 0.5)] which increases
logarithmically with the share of seats controlled by the party that opposes the governor.
Republican Party Control of the State Legislature as a Percentage was calculated by taking the
total number of seats that Republicans controlled in both houses of the legislature and dividing
that number by the combined number of seats held by both Republicans and Democrats and then
multiplying that number by 100.
Information on the partisan control of the governors’ offices was obtained from the
National Governors Association (2010) website. General consumption expenditures by
government were taken from Economic Freedom of North America published by the Fraser
Institute (Ashby et al. 2010). Data on educational attainment was obtained from the U.S. Census
Bureau (2010) website. Educational attainment was measured as the percentage of the population
twenty-five years old or over with a bachelor’s degree or greater. Population and land area
statistics were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau (2010). I calculated population density by
taking the total population of each state and dividing it by its total land area. For more
information regarding measurements see Table: Unit Measurements of Variables in the
Appendix.
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The model was developed with the supposition that the coefficient for government
spending (as a percentage of gross domestic) will be negative while all other coefficients will be
positive, except for that of independent government, for which no assumption is made.
Equation (1) found below, represents the relationship between real per capita GDP
assuming that the intercept and slope coefficients are constant across time and states and the
error term captures differences over time and states. Per capita GDP is function of the lagged
values (one year period) of the independent variables.
(1) Yi(t+1) = b1+ b2DivGit + b3RGit + b4IGit + b5GCit + b6EDUCit + b7PDENit + uit
The model above was checked for the presence of simultaneity. A Hausman Test indicated
that the error term in the regression model is correlated with one or more independent variables
thus rendering both OLS and Random Effects estimates biased and inconsistent. The null
hypothesis of the test is that coefficients estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are
the same as those estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator. If the coefficients are the
same, then the test will have an insignificant P-value, Prob>chi2 larger than .05, and it is safe to
use random effects. However, if the P-value is significant, Prob>chi2 less than .05, then a fixed
effects model is required.
One obvious shortcoming of my model is the lack of a variable that measures a state’s
natural resources (arable land, mineral, gas, and petroleum deposits, climate, water resources,
geographic position that would provide an advantage in trade such as being a state having access
to ocean ports or bordering Mexico and Canada...). Although natural resources should not vary
significantly over the 18 years observed, NAFTA was implemented during this time period
making geographic location an important variable.
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Another shortcoming of my model resulted from my inability to find a source of data that
would measure the stock of both private and public capital for states. The stock of capital is
obviously an important factor in determining a state’s real per capita GDP. This missing factor
would likely vary overtime and would have a direct relationship with real per capita GDP.
Given the available data, Equation (2) found below, was used to take into account the
shortcomings of the model of Equation (1).
(2) Yi(t+1) = α1 + a2DAZ+ a3DAR ...+ a47DWI + λ0 + λ1Dum1991 + λ2Dum1992...
+ λ18Dum2008+ b2DivGit + b3RGit + b4IGit + b5GCit + b6EDUCit + b7PDENit + uit
This equation treats 1990 as the base year, whose intercept value is given by λ0. Seventeen
dummies (Dum) for years 1991 to 2008 are provided. The equation uses α1 to represent the
intercept of the first state, Alabama, while dummies are provided for all other 46 states (for
example DAZ and DAR correspond respectively to Arizona and Arkansas). The variable for
Independent Governor (IG) dropped in the regression that used divided government (DivG) as a
dependent variable because IG was perfectly correlated with divided government (DivG) being
undefined for 4 years in Connecticut, 8 years in Maine, and 4 years in Minnesota. The results of
Equation (2) are shown in Table 4.1 on the next page. An indicator for a Republican majority in
the legislature (RPM), a continuous variable for Republican control of the state legislature
(RPC), an indicator variable for a divided legislature (SPLEG), and an interactive term of
Republican Governor * Republican Majority (RGRPM) are adapted into variations of Equation
(2) for tables 4.2-4.5 on the next page.
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A descriptive summary of statistics used in regressions for this study is shown below in
Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Variables
Variable

Observations

Mean

Std. Deviation

Min.

Max.

Y

846

30892.250000

6592.46

18094.00

59520.00

DivG

830

-0.062892

0.71

-2.32

1.89

RPC

846

46.817160

15.17

8.89

88.57

RPM

846

0.405437

0.49

0.00

1.00

RG

846

0.539007

0.50

0.00

1.00

DG

846

0.442080

0.50

0.00

1.00

IG

846

0.018913

0.14

0.00

1.00

GC

846

21.449720

3.90

12.18

39.01

EDUC

846

23.859480

5.04

11.40

38.70

PDEN

846

186.474400

250.35

4.67

1164.30

SPLEG

846

0.262411

0.44

0.00

1.00

Results of the fixed effects regression of Equation (2) with use of robust clustering are
shown in the tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6. The first set of regressions, SET I, has results for
all 47 states (all contiguous U.S. states except for Nebraska, which has a non-partisan
legislature). The second set of regressions, SET II, has results for 31 states. Alt and Lowry
(1994) considered the states that formed the Confederacy and states bordering the former
Confederate states where Republicans failed to control even one chamber of the legislature to be
in a different category. I therefore exclude the 11 states of the former Confederacy (Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, and Virginia) and bordering states in which Republicans failed to control even one
chamber of the legislature when creating Set II.
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Two Sets of Causality Tests with Per Capita GDP (Y) as the Dependent
Variable
All regressions use lagged values of Right-Hand Variables. Lag period is one year.
Y in time t+1 (the Left-Hand Variable) is a function of Right-Hand Variables in time
t.
SET I (47 States)

SET II (31 States)

Table 4.2: A Regression with a Continuous Variable for Divided Government
SET I
SET II
Variable

Coefficient

t-Stat.

DivG
-23.31
-0.22
RG
-257.96
-1.33
GC
-488.73
-725
EDUC
114.72
2.59
PDEN
25.15
1.75
Constant
29096.01
8.94
R-sq:
within = 0.9185
between = 0.4657
overall = 0.5467
F(22,46) = 123.48
Prob > F = 0.000
Number of Observations: 830

Prob.
0.830
0.191
0.000
0.013
0.087
0.000

Coefficient
-82.86
-172.98
-504.31
168.56
32.20
37144.58

t-Stat.
-0.53
-0.74
-5.91
3.86
1.59
7.11

Prob.
0.601
0.464
0.000
0.001
0.123
0.000

R-sq:
within = 0.9270
between = 0.3607
overall = 0.4341
F(22,30) = 153.07 Prob > F = 0.0000
Number of Observations: 558

Table 4.3: A Regression with an Indicator Variable for a Republican Majority in the
Legislature (RPM) and an Interaction Term for Republican Governor*Republican
Majority (RGRPM)
SET I
SET II
Variable

Coefficient

t-Stat.

Prob.

RPM
227.88
0.76 0.451
RG
-130.47
-0.55 0.587
IG
-559.85
-0.98 0.331
RGRPM
-362.67
-1.32 0.193
GC
-499.39
-750 0.000
EDUC
113.98
2.56 0.014
PDEN
25.12
1.80 0.078
Constant
39545.5
10.72 0.000
R-sq:
within = 0.9195
between = 0.4576
overall = 0.5524
F(24,46) = 140.55
Prob > F = 0.0000
Number of Observations: 846
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Coefficient

t-Stat.

Prob.

377.20
-106.12

1.08
-0.29

0.287
0.772

103.58
-519.63
163.92
32.25
36128.49

-0.28
-5.70
3.63
1.70
7.44

0.778
0.000
0.001
0.100
0.000

R-sq:
within = 0.9275
between = 0.3638
overall = 0.4367
F(23,30) = 139.43 Prob > F = 0.0000
Number of Observations: 558

Table 4.4: A Regression with an Indicator Variable for a Republican Majority in
the Legislature dropping the Interaction Term RGRPM.
SET I
SET II
Variable

Coefficient

t-Stat.

Prob.

RPM
44.18
0.16
RG
-272.94
-1.42
IG
-651.41
-1.13
GC
-492.99
-7.49
EDUC
115.57
2.61
PDEN
25.37
1.80
Constant
39539.6 10.70
R-sq:
within = 0.9190
between = 0.4530
overall = 0.5477
F(23,46) = 145.15
Prob > F = 0.0000
Number of Observations: 846

Coefficient

0.873
0.164
0.266
0.000
0.012
0.079
0.000

t-Stat.

Prob.

333.30
-157.84

1.02
-0.70

0.314
0.492

-518.32
163.54
32.34
36117.79

-5.67
3.64
1.70
7.43

0.000
0.001
0.100
0.000

R-sq:
within = 0.9275
between = 0.3628
overall = 0.4356
F(22,30) = 140.84 Prob F> 0.0000
Number of Observations: 558

Table 4.5: A Regression with a Continuous Variable for Republican Control of the
Legislature.
SET I
SET II
Variable

Coefficient

t-Stat.

Prob.

Coefficient

RPC
-42.66
-2.48
0.017
RG
-217.48
-1.11
0.272
IG
-410.62
-0.82
0.418
GC
-459.06
-7.23
0.000
EDUC
111.82
2.52
0.015
PDEN
22.71
1.54
0.130
Constant
40335.37 10.61
0.000
R-sq:
within = 0.9221
between = 0.4309
overall = 0.5409
F(23,46) = 137.39
Prob> F = 0.0000
Number of Observations: 846

t-Stat.

Prob.

-8.72
-168.22

-0.38
-0.71

0.709
0.485

-497.34
165.56
30.15
36727.49

-5.71
3.77
1.42
6.69

0.000
0.001
0.166
0.000

R-sq:
within = .0.9270
between= 0.3650
overall = 0.4462
F(22,30) = 146.74 Prob > F = 0.0000
Number of Observations: 558
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In this study Maryland and West Virginia were the two states where Republicans failed
to control a single chamber of the legislature. I also exclude Connecticut, Maine, and Minnesota,
since they had independent governors and thus made impossible the calculation of the divided
government. For Set II, the total number of states excluded from the original sample is 16 thus
the difference is 31.
Results for Divided Government, Republican Majority, Partisan Affiliation of Governor, and
Divided Legislative Government
Out of the eighteen years observed for 47 states, there were 830 observed measures of
divided government using the logarithmic measure. Sixteen years dropped due to the existence of
an independent governor. Had the cases of independent governors been included as cases of
divided government, the total number of cases of divided government would have been 409 out
of 846. As indicated by the low values of the t-statistics in Table 4.2, the estimated coefficients
for divided government (DivG) are insignificant. The t-statistic for divided government is
negative 0.22 for Set I, and negative 0.53 for Set II. Obviously, these results do not confirm my
original expectation that divided government has a positive effect on real per capita GDP.
In order to determine whether or not the qualitative factors of Republican Governor and
Republican Majority were independent of one another, the regressions in 4.3 included a term of
interaction for these two variables (RGRPM). The test of the interaction coefficients for RGRPM
fails to reject the null hypothesis of the independence of the qualitative factors Republican
Governor (RG) and Republican Majority (RPM) at all conventional levels. The highest absolute
value of the t-statistic for RGRPM was 1.32.
Low values of t-statistics also indicate that Republican control of the legislature (RPM), an
indicator variable, had an insignificant effect on real per capita GDP. The highest absolute value
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of the t-statistic for RPM was 1.08 (see Table 4.3, SET II). The coefficients for party
denomination of the governor (RG and IG) were also insignificant.
The highest absolute value of the t-statistic for RG was 1.51 (see Table 4.6, SET I). The
highest absolute value of the t-statistic for IG was 1.16 (see Table 4.6, Set I). It appears that the
party denomination of a governor does not have a significant impact on real per capita GDP.
Results for Republican control of the legislature as a continuous variable (RPC) produced
significant results at the ninety-five percent confidence interval (t-statistic = -2.48) with a
coefficient of –42.66 when all 47 states were observed (see Table 4.5). However, once I
excluded the 11 states of the former Confederacy, the two states bordering the south where
Republicans failed to control a single house of the legislature, and the three states with
Independent governors, the coefficient for the variable measuring Republican control of the
legislature became insignificant (t-statistic = -0.38). I found these results to be surprising and
interesting, but inconclusive. Further study is needed to determine whether or not Republican
control of legislatures has a negative effect on real per capita GDP at the state level.
Table 4.6: A Regression with an Indicator Variable for Divided Legislative
Government (SPLEG)
SET I
SET II
Variable

Coefficient

t-Stat.

SPLEG
-56.42
-0.44
RG
-272.62
-1.51
IG
-734.16
-1.16
GC
-509.11
-732
EDUC
108.18
2.68
PDEN
29.27
1.86
Constant
38238.93 10.26
R-sq:
within = 0.9241
between = 0.4371
overall = 0.5144
F(22,46) = 114.38
Prob>F = 0.0000
Number of Observations: 749

Prob.

Coefficient

0.665
0.137
0.250
0.000
0.010
0.070
0.000

t-Stat.

Prob.

-191.41
-176.00

-1.25
-0.78

0.223
0.439

-558.22
144.68
34.40
28635.54

-6.71
4.24
1.60
6.37

0.000
0.000
0.121
0.000

R-sq:
within = 0.9347
between = 0.3601
overall = 0.4218
F(21,30) = 329.65 Prob > F = 0.0000
Number of Observations: 527
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As indicated by both low absolute values for the t-statistics of SPLEG in Table 4.6, the effect
of having divided legislative government appears to be insignificant. This result runs counter to
my original expectations. Given the findings of Rogers (2005) that divided legislatures reduce
legislative output by almost 30%, I expected that the presence of divided legislatures would
improve per capita GDP.
The coefficient for government consumption as a percentage of GDP (GC) is statistically
significant at the .01 level for all ten regressions and has a negative effect as expected. It appears
that for each increase of one percent in government consumption as a percentage of GDP, real
per capita GDP will decrease by between $459 and $558. My results appear to confirm the
findings of Abrams (1999), Gwartney et al. (1998), and Vedder and Gallaway (1998) that
excessive government spending will have a negative impact on GDP. The studies just mentioned
focused on data at the national level. My study, which uses data from individual U.S. states,
confirms an inverse relationship between total combined government spending and real per
capita GDP. These results may be the most important outcome of this study. In spite of the
shortcomings of my model, it appears to produce evidence that excessive government spending
causes real per capita GDP to fall. My results in conjunction with those Helms (1985), Peden
(1991), Abrams (1999), Gwartney et al. (1998), Vedder and Galloway (1998), and Scully (2000)
support the contention of Daniel Mitchell (2005) that “A growing government is contrary to
America’s economic interests ... government spending by its very nature is often economically
destructive, regardless of how it is financed” (p.1).
As expected, educational attainment (EDUC) had a positive effect on real per capita GDP.
Educational attainment varies in significance between the ninety-five and ninety-nine percent
confidence interval. The t-statistics for educational attainment had a range from a low value of
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2.52 to a high value of 4.24. It appears that every one percent increase (in the level of
educational attainment for our population 25 years or older with a bachelor degree or greater)
will cause real per capita GDP to increase by between $108 and $169. As expected, real per
capita GDP increases with a more educated workforce.
The t-statistics for population density (PDEN) varied between a low of 1.42 and a high of
1.86. Given that the variable for population density was only significant at the 0.10 for six out of
ten regressions and was insignificant for the other four regressions, I must conclude that
population density failed to serve as a proxy for capital infrastructure.
I thank Dr. Charles Boehmer for his suggestion to include a linear regression with panelcorrected standard errors. This last regression indicates that divided government would have a
statistically significant positive effect on real per capita GDP and the presence of a Republican
governor would have a statistically significant negative effect. I present these results in Table
4.7. Since this regression is less restrictive than the fixed effects regression I do not make any
conclusions based on these results but I present the results because they do indicate the
possibility that divided government may in fact have a positive effect on real per capita GDP.
Table 4.7: A linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
with a Continuous Variable for Divided Government
SET I
SET II
Variable

Coefficient

DivG
686.65
RG
-1029.16
GC
-636.08
EDUC
768.95
PDEN
4.03
Constant
26614.78
R-sq.= 0.6430
Wald chi2(5) = 6446.56
Number of Observations: 830

Z-Stat.
3.98
-3.13
-14.08
9.84
8.49
9.61

Prob.
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
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Coefficient

Z-Stat.

595.86
2.42
-1132.54
-3.60
-831.49
-16.95
707.60
7.83
3.78
8.92
31933.9
11.24
R-sq. = 0.5757
Wald chi2(5) = 3004.07
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Number of Observations: 558

Prob.
0.015
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
The results of this study failed to demonstrate that divided government has an impact on
real per capita GDP. There is the possibility that divided government has no effect on the scope
of government and the performance of checks and balances. There is also the possibility that my
model was incorrectly specified due to my inability to obtain a variable that would measure
changes in capital infrastructure over time. The omission of this variable may have led to
erroneous results. Further study with such a variable should lead to a better understanding of the
relationship between real per capita GDP and divided government. Omitted-variable bias also
puts into question the level of reliability of all other results of this study.
In spite of the great power that governors have over budgets, it appears that the partisan
affiliation of a governor has no impact on real per capita GDP.
When all 47 states are taken into account, the continuous variable for Republican control of
the legislature had a t-statistic of -2.48 and thus was significant. However, the regression for 31
states rendered a t-statistic of –0.38 for this same variable. Given that one coefficient is
statistically significant while the other one is not, my study is inconclusive regarding the effect of
the Republican control of the legislature. Further study is needed to determine whether or not
there is a relationship between Republican control of state legislature and real per capita GDP.
The results produced in this study do indicate that increases in government consumption
spending as a percentage of GDP are inversely related to real per capita GDP. These results had
the greatest statistical significance. The negative effect of increased government spending on real
per capita GDP supports the three contentions listed below that are put forward by those who
argue that a reduction of government spending and regulation would promote economic growth.
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1. An increase in government consumption is associated with a crowding out of private
spending and investment, and redistribution of income. The redistribution of income
leads to lower productivity (a movement inward from the production possibilities curve).
2. Increases in government spending are associated with larger government and greater
regulation. Greater regulation leads to decreased productivity (a movement inward from
the production possibilities curve).
3. Increases in government spending are associated with larger expansions of
unemployment insurance and public health programs that reduce the incentive to seek
employment and thus reduce productivity. As the government sector grows,
unemployment thus rises and resources are used less efficiently (a movement inward
from the production possibilities curve).
The key to determining how unified Democrat government, unified Republican government,
and divided government affect per capita GDP is tied to the effect that each one of these types of
government will have on spending. I recommend the aforementioned relationship as a subject for
future study along with a study of the relationship between levels of legislative output and
government spending.
Educational attainment as expected appears to have a positive effect on real per capita
GDP. Educational attainment levels serve as a measure of the quality of human capital in a state.
The results of this study failed to demonstrate a consistent relationship between population
density and real per capita GDP. Changes in population density failed to serve as a proxy for
changes in capital infrastructure.
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APPENDIX
Exhibits 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D, and 9 have been reproduced from Gwartney et al. (1998) with some
cosmetic changes. Table 3 is from Vedder and Gallaway (1998). I claim full responsibility for
any possible errors and omissions that may have occurred during the reproduction of these
images and their modification.
Exhibit 9. Comparing Periods of Expansion in Size of Government with Periods
of Shrinkage in Size: The Cases of Ireland, New Zealand and United Kingdom

Country/Time Period

Government Outlays as a Percentage
of GDP
Beginning of
End of Change
Period
Period

Growth of Real
GDP during Period

Ireland
Periods of Expanding
Government
1960-1977
1977-1986
Period of Shrinking
Government
1987-1996

28.0
43.7

43.7
52.3

+15.7
+8.6

4.3
3.4

52.3

37.7

-14.6

5.4

New Zealand
Period of Expanding
Government
1974-1992
Period of Shrinking
Government
1993-1996

34.1

48.4

+14.3

1.2

48.4

42.3

-6.1

3.9

United Kingdom
Period of Expanding
Government
1960-1982
32.2
47.2
+15.0
Period of Shrinking
Government
1983-1989
47.2
40.7
-6.5
Source: Derived from OECD Economic Outlook and OECD Historical Statistics.
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2.2

3.7

40

41

Source: Vedder and Gallaway (1998)
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Table of State and Local General Expenditures for the U.S. by Function, 1965-2007 (in Millions of
Dollars)
Fiscal
Total
Educati Highways Public All
Public Welfare Averages for 1965year
on
Welfare other
as a percentage 1980, 1980-1990,
of Total
1990-2007
1965–66.
82843 33287
12770
6757 30029
8.2%
1966–67.
93350 37919
13932
8218 33281
8.8%
1967–68.
102411 41158
14481
9857 36915
9.6%
1968–69.
116728 47238
15417 12110 41963
10.4%
1969–70.
131332 52718
16427 14679 47508
11.2%
1970–71.
150674 59413
18095 18226 54940
12.1%
1971–72.
168549 65813
19021 21117 62598
12.5%
1972–73.
181357 69713
18615 23582 69447
13.0%
1973–74.
198959 75833
19946 25085 78095
12.6%
1974–75.
230722 87858
22528 28156 92180
12.2%
1975–76.
256731 97216
23907 32604 103004
12.7%
1976–77.
274215 102780
23058 35906 112472
13.1%
1977–78.
296984 110758
24609 39140 122478
13.2%
1978–79.
327517 119448
28440 41898 137731
12.8%
Avg. 19651979–80.
369086 133211
33311 47288 155276
12.8%
1980=11.7%
1980–81.
407449 145784
34603 54105 172957
13.3%
1981–82.
436733 154282
34520 57996 189935
13.3%
1982–83.
466516 163876
36655 60906 205080
13.1%
1983–84.
505008 176108
39419 66414 223068
13.2%
1984–85.
553899 192686
44989 71479 244745
12.9%
1985–86.
605623 210819
49368 75868 269568
12.5%
1986–87.
657134 226619
52355 82650 295510
12.6%
1987–88.
704921 242683
55621 89090 317527
12.6%
1988–89.
762360 263898
58105 97879 342479
12.8%
Avg. 1980-1990=
1989–90.
834818 288148
61057 110518 375094
13.2%
13.0%
1990–91.
908108 309302
64937 130402 403467
14.4%
1991–92.
981253 324652
67351 158723 430526
16.2%
1992–93. 1030434 342287
68370 170705 449072
16.6%
1993–94. 1077665 353287
72067 183394 468916
17.0%
1994–95. 1149863 378273
77109 196703 497779
17.1%
1995–96. 1193276 398859
79092 197354 517971
16.5%
1996–97. 1249984 418416
82062 203779 545727
16.3%
1997–98. 1318042 450365
87214 208120 572343
15.8%
1998–99. 1402369 483259
93018 218957 607134
15.6%
1999–
2000.
1506797 521612
101336 237336 646512
15.8%
2000–01. 1626066 563575
107235 261622 693634
16.1%
2001–02. 1736866 594694
115295 285464 741413
16.4%
2002–03. 1821917 621335
117696 310783 772102
17.1%
2003–04. 1908543 655182
117215 340523 795622
17.8%
2004–05. 2012110 688314
126350 365286 832161
18.2%
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2005–06.

2122967 728922

136495 371997 885552

17.5%

Avg. 19902006–07. 2265284 776626
144807 389123 954729
17.2%
2007=16.6%
This table is modified from its original form in the Economic Report of the President 2010. Adrian
Villasenor added the last two columns. Source: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/download.html

Table: Unit Measurements of Variables
Variable
Variable
Unit of Measurement
Mnemonic Description
Y

DivG

RPC

RPM

RG, IG

GC

EDUC
PDEN
SPLEG

Real per Capita
Gross Domestic
Product
Divided
Government

Republican
Party Control of
the State
Legislature as a
Percentage
Dummy for
Republican
Majority
(RPC>50)
Dummies for
Republican and
Independent
Governors
General
Consumption
Expenditures by
Government as
a Percentage of
GDP
Educational
Attainment
Population
Density
Dummy for
Divided
Legislature

State Per Capita Gross State Product in 2000 Chained
Dollars. This quantity is measured for a fiscal year.
The variable of divided government is defined as DGst =
− log [(gst + 0.5) / (nst – gst + 0.5)] where nst is defined
as the total combined number of seats in the upper and
lower legislative houses (indexed by state s and year t)
and gst is defined as the number of legislative seats
possessed by the party of the governor.
The percentage of seats held by Republicans of the total
number of seats held by both Republicans and
Democrats in both houses of the state legislature.

A dummy indicating that Republicans held over 50% of
the combined legislative seats of both houses of the state
legislature.
A dummy indicating the party of the governor.

Federal and State Government Consumption Spending
as a Percentage of State Gross Domestic Product. This
quantity is measured for a fiscal year.

The percentage of population twenty-five years old and
over with at least a bachelors degree.
Total population of the state divided by the total land
area of the state.
A distinct party controls each house of the legislature.
Republicans control one house of the legislature and
Democrats control the other house of the legislature.
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